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Interest group activity is always affected by the political environment in which 
groups operate. As a result, effective study of public interest groups must situate 
them in a larger political context. We propose a means of doing so by building 
on theoretical and empirical studies of both social movements and interest 
groups. We argue that groups can best be understood by changing the unit of 
analysis from an individual group to the set of groups pursuing common 
agendas, or an “interest group sector.” Drawing from both empirical and 
theoretical literature, we establish both the necessity and the theoretical 
parameters for a sectoral analysis, and offer a basic framework for such an 
analysis. We demonstrate empirical support for a sectoral approach by looking 
at the periodicity of group formation in five public interest sectors. We then 
propose a six stage framework to describe a cyclic process of issue emergence, 
resource mobilization, organization building, and their relation to the policy 
process. We conclude by discussing the potential policy impact of interest group 
mobilization and institutionalization, and its relationship to democracy. 
Interest groups make history, we might paraphrase an earlier analyst, but not in 
circumstances they choose. Instead, they are aided, encouraged, and/ or thwarted 
in their efforts by a number of structural and strategic factors that shape their 
emergence, development, and demise. It is only by recognizing the contextual 
constraints on interest group activity that we can begin to understand their successes 
and failures, the utility and costs of various strategies, and most significantly, the 
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role of organized groups in the larger policy process. Effective study of interest 
groups must situate the groups in a larger political context. We suggest a means 
of doing so by building on theoretical and empirical studies of both social 
movements and interest groups. In this article we argue that interest group politics 
can best be understood by changing the unit of analysis from an individual group 
to a larger collection of groups with similar concerns, or an interest group sector. 
This approach allows the analysis of groups and their political influence to be more 
closely integrated with the broader social and political phenomena and the larger 
policy process of which they are a part. 
We begin by briefly reviewing the literature on the origins of interest groups and 
their relation to a larger political context, explaining why a new approach that 
addresses sectors rather than individual groups is needed. We then discuss the 
important role that external factors have on potential social mobilization and 
organization building, using literature on political opportunity and policy reform. 
Having established both the necessity and the theoretical parameters for a sectoral 
analysis, we offer a basic framework for further study. We demonstrate empirical 
support for a sectoral approach to the study of interest groups by looking at patterns 
of group formation in six public interest sectors. Building on a variety of empirical 
and theoretical studies, we propose a five stage framework to describe the process 
of organization building and its relation to the policy process. We conclude by 
discussing the potential policy impact of mobilization and institutionalization. 
INTEREST GROUP ORIGINS AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Students of interest groups, mostly working in political science, and students of 
social movements, mostly in sociology, have worked on parallel tracks for several 
decades, first overstating, then undervaluing, the effect of political context on 
political mobilization and representation. Unfortunately scholars in the different 
disciplines have generally talked past each other, rarely drawing from each other’s 
work. The process of mobilization in social movements is, however, clearly related 
to the organization of interest groups, and both are affected by and influence the 
larger political climate. 
Truman gave voice to the post-war pluralist notion that interest group 
participation in the political process is an inherent characteristic of the American 
system; he traced the origins of groups to the external political environment. 
Disturbances in society, in particular new political issues or constituents, give rise 
to a “spontaneous coalescence of interests” in the form of groups that compete for 
access and influence in American politics.’ Dahl developed and formalized the 
pluralist paradigm with his notion of “polyarchal democracy,” in which groups 
develop to represent nascent constituencies, then bargain with political leaders and 
parties for influence on the policy process. Acknowledging the unequal distribution 
of resources among groups, Dahl nonetheless contended that no nascent group was 
without resources, or the potential to develop solidarity and influence within the 
political arena.2 
Dahl’s early version of pluralism has endured an unrelenting series of attacks 
from numerous perspectives. A wide range of analysts argued that some groups 
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are denied access not only to the political arena and to organizational resources,3 
but even to the political consciousness needed to frame demands.4 Others 
questioned whether the political product of conflicting groups is just, in the national 
interest, or even a contribution to effective governance.5 Critics of pluralism raise 
three sets of questions, first: which groups are able and likely to mobilize and in 
what venues? Second, to what extent is this mobilization the result of circumstances 
within a group’s control? Third, what is the relationship between groups, once 
organized and institutionalized, to their purported constituency and its interests, 
and to public policy? 
Truman’s analysis of groups, explicitly political, focused analytic attention on 
the conditions or disturbances which gave rise to their emergence. The development 
of any group reflected the larger political environment, a reasonable premise. The 
essential flaw, however, is the supposition that group representation is a transparent 
reflection of the constellation of diverse interests in society, the assumption that 
any “disturbance” would create group representation, and conversely, that any 
group was the result of a political disturbance. Paradoxically, this tautology 
diminishes the analytic importance of tactical choice, the stuff of politics. 
The next wave of scholarly attention focused on the difficulties inherent in 
mobilizing political activity and sustaining organizations. Olson and subsequent 
observers focused instead on the organizational dynamics of groups, criticizing the 
pluralist paradigm for overvaluing the contribution of political programs to group 
formation and maintenance.6 Olson contends potential groups members are likely 
to “free ride” on group activity, recognizing that their marginal contribution to 
group activity seldom affects a group’s political prospects, yet carries personal costs. 
Groups can overcome this problem by offering selective incentives to prospective 
members in return for participation. By focusing on “exchange” relationships,7 the 
rational actor model drew needed attention to the internal workings of groups, but 
in the process political activity became little more than a means to attract supporters 
and provide for organizational maintenance. Clearly, however, external political 
circumstances set the context in which the calculus of participation takes place, 
determining the urgency of particular issues, and the scope and intensity of conflict.’ 
The critical problem remains integrating the internal processes of groups with their 
larger political role. 
The literature on social movements developed along a parallel path. In the 1950s 
and 1960s analysts generally attributed the emergence of social protest movements 
to some kind of societal dysfunction. Social protest, a form of expression seen as 
entirely distinct from conventional interest group participation, was the product 
of some kind of social breakdown, a function of anomie, society’s failure to provide 
“intermediary associations,” “ relative deprivation,“or some other kind of aggregate 
psychological disorder.’ 
Responding to the political movements of the 196Os, which the old “break-down” 
approaches could neither explain nor analyze effectively, scholars began to view 
social protest as a political choice made by those unlikely to win through more 
conventional political activities. Like students of interest groups, social movement 
scholars turned to the exchange relationships through which organizers produced 
protests. The “resource mobilization” model stressed the rationality of protest 
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politics and the role of organized groups in structuring social movements. lo Often, 
however, the political context, and particularly the role of the state, disappeared 
in this model. Recent literature on protest has reintegrated the role of political 
context and state action in shaping social protest movements by recognizing that 
changes in context alter the marginal values of resources and incentives in exchange 
relationships.” 
Political context is especially significant to public interest representation. While 
Olson’sfree rider seems to void possibilities for the emergence of groups explicitly 
concerned with collective goods, or representing constituencies with extremely 
limited political resources, the free rider problem is clearly not insurmountable, 
as public interest groups do form, survive, and advocate for policy change. l2 Indeed, 
members of such groups derive satisfaction from participating, often even in the 
absence of selective benefits. This suggests that some number of individuals are 
willing to make personal sacrifices in order to participate in public interest advocacy, 
or that they may indeed view political participation not as a cost, but as a benefit 
in itself.13 The circumstances under which large numbers of people are willing to 
take this view, however, are limited, both in occurrence and duration. We need 
to look critically at context in order to understand just what these conditions are. 
We see the free rider problem as less a constant obstacle than an elastic tendency 
that responds to external circumstances. It is not surprising, for example, that 
contributions to a good government group such as Common Cause increased in 
the wake of the Watergate scandal, or that membership in environmental groups 
increased in response to Reagan administration policy and rhetoric environmen- 
talists found provocative, or that a movement against nuclear weapons flourished 
during the early Reagan years, when the President spoke of “winnable” nuclear 
wars and engendered elite, as well as mass, opposition.‘4 In times of perceived crisis, 
free riders are less likely to see non-participation as rational or justifiable; in times 
of large scale mobilization, they are more likely to see their participation as 
potentially efficacious, creating a sort of pile-on or bandwagon effect.15 
CONTEXT AND MOBILIZATION: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 
STRUCTURE AND DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS 
Political context and institutional structures shape the opportunities for dissent and 
channel its expression. Systematic integration of context in the analysis of social 
protest and interest representation has developed slowly within the social science 
literature. Eisinger used the “structure of political opportunities” as a set of 
independent variables to explain which urban governments were most likely to 
encounter protest in the late 1960s.r6 He found protest most likely to occur in cities 
with a combination of what he termed “open” and “closed” institutions, that is, 
moderately accessible to citizen claims and participation. A complete lack of 
tolerance for dissent deterred protest while extremely open and accessible 
governments preempted it, In short, the availability of institutional means of redress 
directly affected the mobilization of dissent and the tactical choices activists made. 
Tilly applied Eisinger’s findings to national governments, emphasizing the 
continuity between extra-institutional and institutional political action, and the 
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state’s role in channeling dissent. States can repress protest, or channel it into less 
volatile or disruptive venues. In this way repressive states can postpone or prevent 
the emergence of social protest, while extremely tolerant states may preempt protest 
by bringing new challengers into the polity.‘7 Seemingly like movements meet very 
different fates depending on the political institutions they challenge. Governments 
control both the degree of access to decision-making groups enjoy as well as their 
own policy responses. In a cross-national comparison of antinuclear power 
movements in four liberal polities, Kitschelt explained both movement forms and 
policy influence with reference to formal state structures. Antinuclear activists 
confronting relatively closed states, such as France, chose confrontational strategies, 
he contends, while their counterparts in more open and less efficacious states, like 
the United States, chose “assimilative” approaches.” 
The approaches outlined above look at opportunity structures as constants, 
useful analytically only for cross-sectional comparisons, but opportunity is not 
simply a function of relatively static institutions.” Policy and policymakers also 
play critical roles and change over time. McAdam advances a political process 
framework, in which there is an interplay between state action and insurgent 
challenges. He shows, for example, that a decline in the number of lynchings in 
the 1930s provided blacks in the United States with sufficient space to begin building 
stronger indigenous political organizations.20 In response to the emergence of a 
growing and potentially disruptive civil rights movement in the 1960s President 
Kennedy, along with funders and other political figures, worked to funnel dissident 
activities into less disruptive channels, including voter education and registration.” 
The availability of additional venues for political action, particularly within urban 
politics and the Democratic party, thus split the civil rights movement into two 
camps, one committed to working within political institutions for incremental gains, 
another committed to extra-institutional protest and advancing broader claims. 
This example suggests not only that incipient groups must have some degree of 
political freedom in order to mobilize, but also that they will strive to differentiate 
between themselves, entrench their organizations, and secure resources in response 
to a changing political environment. Researchers identify similar patterns of public 
interest group constraint by, and response to political context over time in women’s 
liberation, farm workers, antinuclear weapons, and poor people’s movements.22 
OPEN MOMENTS, POLITICAL SPACE, AND POLICY WINDOWS 
Both institutional activity and system-level crisis can create opportunities for 
mobilization within a sector. Political crises can open the political system to new 
challenges and alternative policies, 
moments.“23 
creating what Gourevitch terms “open 
State failure can politicize the citizenry and fragment elite unity, 
potentially prompting reexamination of both government policy and political 
alliances. As new political alignments emerge, the balance of power between the 
contenders may be fundamentally altered, creating new openings in the structure 
of political opportunity. Organized labor, for example, enjoyed substantially more 
institutional political influence in the New Deal coalition than it did in the political 
alignments following the crises of the 1890s and 1970~.~~ 
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Major realigning crises are rare, however, while social protest and interest group 
mobilization are not. Policy reform or public events can also enhance the “political 
space” available to public interest groups, that is the “opportunities for legitimate 
mobilization not monopolized by established linkage mechanisms.“25 Political 
space expands as new policy problems appear, as government policy changes, and 
as political expectations are raised. It contracts as activist concerns are satisfied 
or as public attention shifts away from a sector’s concerns. Interest groups, along 
with government institutions, political parties, and other groups, attempt to take 
advantage of expanding political opportunity, and compete for survival as these 
opportunities diminish.26 As windows of opportunity close, a new institutional order 
develops with a new policy consensus that inhibits the development of new 
challenging organizations and limits the available space on the political agenda for 
new claims.27 
TOWARD A SECTORAL ANALYSIS 
Several generations of research on interest groups and social protest movements 
has yet to produce anything approaching consensus on their role in the policy 
process. In part, this reflects the fluid nature of American politics and the difficulty 
of assessing meaningful access to policy makers and political influence. Further 
complicating the issue, groups rarely act alone in or around the policy process. 
Numerous groups generally work in coalition and competition on given policy 
areas, applying a broad range of tactics to sometimes similar and sometimes 
different ends. As a result, identifying discrete causes for a group’s success or failure 
is no simple matter. By moving to consider the broader set of actors concerned 
with a particular policy area, we can develop a stronger approach to evaluate group 
influence on the policy process. 
A great deal of research and theory has been directed at particular aspects of 
the relationship between movements, groups, and their environments, focusing, for 
example, on the activity and development of single group,28 comparing tactics across 
a number of different groups; investigating internal group dynamics, characterizing 
group decision-making and survival, and discussing the overall shape of pressure 
politics in America.29 Considering sectors, rather than individual groups, allows 
us to bridge the gaps between studies of particular groups and macropolitical 
analyses. 
Research on “issue networks” in political science, and on “policy domains” in 
sociology, has begun to build these bridges.30 Focusing narrowly on the policy 
process, such network analyses recognize the important roles of such diverse actors 
as legislative staff, agency administrators, academic experts, foundations, and a host 
of interest group lobbyists. These analyses neglect, however, the broader political 
context in which networks exist. A sectoral approach remedies this deficit. 
Interest group sectors are composed of the set of organized groups that share 
broadly similar policy concerns.31 Their shared political concerns encourage groups 
both to form alliances to enhance policy influence, and to compete in pursuit of 
resources such as members, patrons, issues, causes, and privileged access to 
government.32 Sectors reflect to some degree the variety of private interests 
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operating in American politics, replicating the interests, for example, of various 
industries, regions, or constituencies. We are most concerned with those sectors 
explicitly concerned with public interest causes. Set against the variety of groups 
representing private interests operating in American politics, public interest groups 
maintain only a tenuous hold on organizational resources and policy access. 
By definition, public interest groups pursue political benefits not limited to 
members of the group, for example: clean air, diminished threat from nuclear 
weapons, comprehensive labelling on processed food, or the eradication of 
poverty.33 Because public interest groups are highly vulnerable to shifts in both 
public concern and governmental response, they are a sensitive bellwether of the 
representative dynamic at work in the United States.34 The extent to which they 
reflect, amplify, or minimize public concerns is thus an important measure of 
democracy. 
Placing the interest group sector at the center of analysis allows an awareness 
of the systemic variables that cause issues to move in and out of public attention, 
and these factors must inform detailed examination of individual groups. Sectoral 
analysis allows for both an evaluation of the marketplace as a whole, and a 
comparison of tactics adopted by groups within the same sector, ostensibly facing 
the same conditions and pressures. We can assess the utility of group choices by 
comparing the success and survival of groups within the same sector. We can 
examine the effects of contextual factors by studying the growth or decline of the 
sector as a whole. 
Analysts of interest groups have already worked within the basic precepts of 
sectoral analysis, identifying, for example, the differing concerns, tactics, and 
resources of labor, corporate, and ideologically-oriented groups.3s In defining public 
interest group sectors, analysts tend to assume a coincidence of interests and 
constituents, as in business and labor organizations.36 This approach relegates 
public interest groups to an undifferentiated “other”category. It also operates under 
the assumption that groups expressing diverse concerns such as women’s rights, 
human rights, environmental protection, opposition to war, and various visions 
of social justice will operate in the same way as groups that define their interests 
far more narrowly. A constituency definition is inadequate within public interest 
sectors, first because most groups explicitly disdain the notion that they represent 
a particular segment of society, and second, because virtually all public interest 
groups generally appeal for support directly to the same broad constituency, 
primarily the well-educated middle classes and a relatively small group of private 
foundations and governmental funders. 
Sectors are better characterized by the political ends groups seek, even if political 
goals may shift in response to organizers’ perceptions of the political opportunities 
they face. This means that groups may move from issue to issue, or even straddle 
sectors in response to the political environment.37 Groups define their concerns with 
one eye toward their constituents and potential constituents, and another toward 
the political arena. Thus leaders are concerned not only with the most pressing 
issues, but also with the specific concerns of their members and sponsors. Group 
entrepreneurs are exceptionally sensitive to fluctuations in the market because they 
have to be. 
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MOBILIZATION AND COMPETITION 
WITHIN PUBLIC INTEREST SECTORS 
Public interest movements are able to generate only sporadic peaks of mobilization, 
but not for want of trying. Indeed, activists are always trying to achieve their vision 
of the public interest by mobilizing action to influence government. This constancy 
of effort, in conjunction with only occasional bursts of mobilization, suggests that 
we should look beyond the internal dynamics of a group to understand its successes 
and failures. 
Political organizations depend on the flow of resources, including money, 
members, and attention. Yet potential funders seeking policy influence often prefer 
other avenues of access. If funders have more direct routes of political influence, 
supporting the less direct route of interest group activity becomes less attractive. 
Further, while professional and managerial associations rationally cooperate to 
pursue economic self-interest, these same associations have every incentive to free- 
ride on public interest advocacy. This dynamic limits the types of groups and 
political causes foundations, corporations and private individuals are likely to 
support. 
In pursuit of organizational survival, groups seek stable supplies of resources. 
To this end they attempt to establish “domain” over clients, members, functions 
and services.38 In times of sectoral expansion, organizations proliferate, each seeking 
to capture resources available to the entire sector.3g New organizations spring up 
and old ones orient themselves to popular new issues. Common Cause, for example, 
expanded its traditional good government agenda to include nuclear weapons issues 
in the early 1980s when public attention to defense issues increased in the wake 
of a broad challenging movement on nuclear weapons policy. Although not clearly 
linked to the Common Cause charter, leaders believed, correctly as it turned out, 
that such a shift would aid the organization’s growth.40 
At a movement’s peak, we see a familiar pattern in which a broad and diverse 
coalition of groups loosely unites in the pursuit of a few broadly defined goals. 
Civil rights, for example, unified a diverse insurgent movement in the 1950s and 
1960s. Shortly afterward, an extremely diverse coalition emerged to oppose the 
Vietnam war. The breadth of a movement coalition, and the number of constituent 
groups within it, affect the form and potential influence of mobilization. A broad 
and decentralized coalition widens the range of potential entry points to political 
activism. Movement coalitions then may aim at a variety of access points, becoming 
far less predictable and less susceptible to repression or cooptation. 
Individual groups are often overshadowed, however, by the larger movement. 
When available resources are expanding, each group can carve out an independent 
niche and capture distinct issues and constituencies. The environmental protection 
sector, for example, includes groups primarily concerned with preserving public 
lands and others focused on preventing toxic waste dumping. Diversity and growth 
within a sector is a strength for policy influence, but it may be problematic for 
individual groups.41 As a sector saturates, either through group proliferation or 
through diminished resources, groups increasingly come into competition with each 
other, needing a larger market share in order to maintain themselves. The imperative 
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of organizational survival virtually forces allied groups to distinguish themselves 
not only from each other, but from the movement as a whole. Consequently, as 
a movement grows and draws more organizations into its wake, each organization 
is subjected to increasingly powerful pressures to specialize, breaking away from 
a larger coalition in the process.42 
Internal pressures to institutionalize and centralize decision-making lead to the 
development of bureaucratic structures more suited to organizational survival than 
either tactical innovation or political influence.43 Even coalitions face these pressures 
as they come to compete for resources available to the whole sector. The nuclear 
disarmament movement’s history illustrates this process. Activists formed the 
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) in 1957 to coordinate a broad 
spectrum of peace activism. SANE quickly became a distinct and independent 
organization, as did Mobilization for Survival in 1970s and the Nuclear Weapons 
Freeze Clearinghouse in the 1980s. In each case the coalition became a distinct 
organizational entity, with its own staff, direction, and survival pressures.44 
Coordinating groups effectively created additional competition within the sector 
in the form of a new professional organization. 
This course of professionalization and bureaucratization of movement 
organizations is endemic to social movements in the United States, and it is also 
problematic. Institutionalization and professionalization redirect many groups 
toward more modest, and inherently more conservative, objectives. As Wilson 
notes, “In the long run . . . all organizations seek some form of accommodation 
with their environment, because the costs of sustaining indefinitely a combat- 
oriented organization are generally too high to be borne by the members.“45 
Wilson, valuing systemic stability, sees this accommodation and moderation as 
a virtue of pluralist politics. Piven and Cloward concur with his analysis of 
organizational evolution, but challenge his normative evaluation, contending that 
institutional politics fails to respond to challenging groups unless threatened by 
disruption. They argue that challengers can enhance their prospects for influence 
by emphasizing disruptive mobilization rather than organization building.46 The 
leading edge of mobilization almost invariably comes from outside established 
organizations, as institutional groups develop a patterned form of expression and 
activism that is insulated from new constituencies, concerns, and tactics.47 
As sectors contract, entrenched groups choose tactics to ensure their survival 
by improving prospects for financial support and legislative access. Strategies for 
hard times include neutering their political agenda and concurrently distancing 
themselves from grassroots constituents in order to moderate goals and tactics. 
Conventional political action in pursuit of moderate goals may generate incremental 
victories in institutional politics, but it seldom motivates grassroots activism. 
Paradoxically, as a group or coalition moves closer to the Washington culture, it 
becomes less threatening as it sheds its grassroots movement ties. As the distance 
between the movement and its institutional representatives increases, both wings 
suffer. Groups in Washington lose their “left,” with its movement-based legitimacy 
and disruptive potential. The grassroots lose media attention4* an organizational 
base, and the capacity to mobilize. Organizations generally survive at the expense 
of the movements that create them.49 
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POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY AND SECTORAL EXPANSION: 
A PRELIMINARY TEST 
We have argued that public interest group formation and survival reflects the 
external political environment. During periods of expanding political opportunity 
in a sector, new groups form and existing groups flourish. Conversely, as 
opportunity within a sector constricts, the number and well-being of groups in that 
sector should also suffer. If this is true, we should be able to observe the 
phenomenon in the development of various sectors. Using national organization 
directories,” we compiled founding dates between 1900 and 1985 for groups within 
five different public interest group sectors: anti-poverty, civil rights, animal rights, 
child welfare, and consumer protection. For each sector, we included all groups 
with primarily national rather than regional interests and which indicated a 
principal concern with national advocacy or legislative activity rather than service 
provision. We condensed multiple organizations that shared addresses, phone 
numbers, and boards of directors to one listing, yielding a sample of 196 groups. 
Founding dates reflect sectoral mobilization, as groups form during periods of 
sectoral expansion. Since entreprenuerial skill is likely to be distributed randomly 
across sectors and over time, if this were the most important variable affecting group 
formation, we would expect to find a random distribution of group formation dates. 
Instead, the rate of group formation as a whole varied dramatically, as this tactic 
of political representation was advantaged at certain times. Rather than appear with 
equal likelihood across each of the years under investigation, we find an upsurge 
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in new group formation first between 1900 and 1920, then between 1935 and 1940, 
and then increasing at a rapid pace from 1966 to 1975. 
These periods coincide with broader shifts in national attention, government 
policy, and political economy. All sectors spawned new organizations with 
increasing frequency from the New Deal forward, most dramatically during the 
middle 1960s through the mid-80s. Indeed, fully 68 percent (133 groups) of the 
groups found in 1989 formed after the advent of the Great Society in 1965. In regard 
to questions of social justice, for example, sectoral expansion accompanied the 
settlement house movement, the New Deal, and the Great Society programs. By 
far the greatest period of expansion among these public interest sectors occurred 
between 1966 and 1975, coinciding with expansions of federal initiatives. Expanded 
federal and private support resulted in a rapidly increasing number of public interest 
group claimants.” 
The increasingly turbulent picture characterizing the period between 1975 and 
1985 (roughly the period including the Carter presidency and first Reagan term) 
also indicates the effectiveness with which the Reagan administration attacked the 
network of challenging and dissident public interest groups reliant on some 
combination of federal and foundation support,52 as shown by the rapid decline 
in rates of group formation within the anti-poverty, child welfare and civil rights 
sectors. Their subsequent resurgence later in the decade, in response to perceived 
hostility from the Reagan administration to domestic social spending, confirms the 
importance of political context to group formation. 
Group formation also varied from sector to sector. A notable increase in activity 
in the civil rights sector accompanied the developing civil rights movement and 
continued through the subsequent government response, the War on Poverty. 
Animal rights groups, which emerged periodically throughout the century, surged 
dramatically during the Carter and Reagan presidencies, when groups concerned 
with social justice were unable to find similar success. In short, the patterns of public 
interest group formation suggest that contextual factors affect group development. 
First, political alignment and patterns of interest representation affect the general 
pattern of group formation as a strategy for influence. Second, shifts in the political 
context make certain issue areas more attractive to funders and activists at certain 
times. Taken together, this means we need to look at the political context in order 
to understand both strategies of influence and types of interest group claims. 
POLICY INFLUENCE 
As political opportunity for a sector declines, groups increasingly seek to wean 
themselves from dependence on a broader social movement, leading to a pattern 
of sporadic public interest in a variety of issues. Downs contends that the public’s 
attention span for new issues is limited, and a protest constituency simply loses 
interest or shifts its concerns elsewhere as people realize the intractability of major 
social problems.53 In this view, social protest is little more than a sideshow. As a 
result, groups that define themselves primarily by an issue orientation necessarily 
lose ground and access with time. The substantial costs of sustaining extra- 
institutional mobilization eventually grow so large that entrepreneurs seek 
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accommodation with the state and abandon extra-institutional activity, or lose the 
capacity to mobilize sufficient support to continue operations. Organizations thus 
seek to devise moderate goals and strategies that allow them to routinize and 
institutionalize their activity, abandoning their own grassroots. 
Institutionalized organizations find their concerns moderated and their range of 
activity limited. The political ramifications of this institutionalization remain a 
matter of contention.54 Some scholars argue that institutionalization may provide 
a platform for launching broader and more effective challenges to state policy.55 
Others contend that institutionalization may allow groups to be more effective, but 
only in pursuit of substantially narrower and incremental goals.56 Still others 
contend that institutionalized groups invariably develop a vested interest in 
protecting both their own survival and the routinized politics in which they can 
participate.57 Activists and scholars alike are left with a confusing message about 
interest group and social movement activity, and little clear direction about routes 
for meaningful change. The policy effects of various strategies of influence is an 
important area for further research. 
SECTORAL MOBILIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: 
A CYCLE OF GROWTH AND DECLINE 
In the sections above, we’ve reviewed the relevant issues connected with sectoral 
mobilization and decline, suggesting a relationship between external and internal 
factors on group politics. While the tactical decisions groups make are surely 
important to their prospects for survival or influence, more critical is the broader 
policy climate within which groups operate. Sectors expand in response to a nascent 
social problem, groups seek institutional access and stability, perhaps generating 
policy response, then seek to survive when the wave of public attention has passed. 
We present below a schematic six stage model of a cycle of public interest group 
expansion and contraction: 
1. Recognition of a Social Problem: A disturbance to the status quo arouses 
public concern and/or dissent. This may result from policy reform, swings 
in political alignment, or new policy problems. 
2. Extra-Institutional mobilization takes place at one or several levels, ranging 
from expert disaffection reflected in critical journal articles to street protest. 
3. Media Recognition of both the policy problem and social protest defines 
social and political problems, frames potential solutions, and identifies 
relevant actors. 
4. Resource Mobilization may include funding from private, foundation, 
corporate, and government sources, as well as increased member interest. 
It is accompanied by relaxed barriers to government access for public interest 
groups associated with the recognized issue. 
5. Niche Building activity ensues as groups try to solidify their positions, 
differentiate among themselves, and stabilize the demand for their activity, 
ensuring organizational survival. 
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6. Resource Contraction follows from a number of outcomes including policy 
success (satisfying concerned supporters), unambigous defeat through 
repression, or shifting public interests. As available resources contract, there 
is a “shake-out” within the sector, and groups disappear or retrench. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we’ve shown that political context plays a critical role in the 
emergence and development of public interest groups. We have argued that sectoral 
rather than individual group analysis promises the best means of assessing the 
influence of organized groups on the policy process, specifically because it allows 
analysts to establish a context in which groups’ strategic and tactical decisions take 
place. We’ve presented data on interest group formation which strongly suggests 
we look not to the issue entrepeneur, but to the political context in order to 
understand group formation and activity. 
We’ve suggested a six stage framework, which follows groups from incipient 
interests to entrenched organizations, to organize subsequent research. Sectoral 
analysis, in the context of awareness of cyclic patterns of mobilization and 
institutionalization, should help us understand the circumstances under which 
groups emerge, the relation of groups to broader social movements, and the ultimate 
influence of groups on policy. Sectoral analysis, along with the six stage framework 
we outline, demands further research that explicitly seeks to connect interest group 
activity to both social movements and the policy process. These are important 
matters, both theoretically and politically. 
One of the ongoing problems with democratic systems concerns who has a voice 
in decision-making. This article has suggested that while public interest groups may 
provide an important type of representation otherwise absent from decision making 
forums, public interest groups gain and lose influence in a highly constrained 
context. The political and policy impact of a cycle of dissident protest is an ultimate 
test of democracy in the United States. To the extent broad public concerns win 
serious attention within political institutions and elicit meaningful policy response, 
the pluralist interpretation of American democracy holds. If, however, cycles of 
protest end with symbolic incorporation and rhetorical concessions without real 
procedural inclusion or policy reform, interest group liberalism remains a diversion 
from democracy rather than its embodiment. 
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